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WHEN ATHLETES BREACH: TORTIOUS
INTERFERENCE WITH THE CONTRACTUAL

RELATION OF SEASON TICKET HOLDERS
I. INTRODUCTION
"It is usually said that tort liability may be imposed upon a
defendant who intentionally and improperly interferes with
the plaintiff's rights under a contract with anotherperson if
the interference . . . makes the contract rights . . . less

valuable."'
As the cost of attending an athletic event increases, so too does fan
frustration with team owners and their highly compensated athletes. Many
fans have looked to the courts to provide a legal salve for their
frustrations. 2 Season-ticket holders of the National Hockey League's
Ottawa Senators recently sued the teams star player, Alexei Yashin, for
tortious interference with contractual relations. 3 The season ticket holders
argued that their season ticket contract with the Senators included, by its
implied terms, Yashin's agreement to perform for the team and its fans,
and Yashin's refusal to play interfered with their contract.4 Although the
court rejected the plaintiffs claim, the case raises an interesting question:
I W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129 at 978
(5th ed. 1984).
2 See generally Charpentier v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., 75 Cal. App. 4th 301
(1999)(holding no breach of contract with season ticket holder when team relocated to new
city); Skalbania v. Simmons, 443 N.E.2d 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)(finding class status for
season ticket holders where team failed to complete season); Strauss v. Long Island Sports
Inc., 401 N.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)(involving suit by fans against pro basketball
team for trading star player).
3 See Potechin v. Yashin, [2000] 186 D.L.R.4th 757. Defendant Yashin, the star
player and captain of the Senators Hockey Club, refused to play out the final year of his
four-year, $20 million contract with the Senators unless the team renegotiated the contract.
Id. at 758. Plaintiff Potechin, a Senators season ticket holder, brought a $27.5 million class
action suit against Yashin arguing that Yashin caused the team to breach its season ticket
contract with Potechin and all other similarly situated fans by failing to perform under the
contract. Id.
4 See id. Potechin argued that the Senators heavily marketed Yashin with the intent
of inducing fans to purchase season-tickets. Id. at 761. Potechin further argued that
implied terms within his season ticket contract represented that "barring uncontrolled
events" - i.e. injury or trade - Yashin would play for the team. Id.
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Do fans ever have
5 legal remedy when athletes breach their contracts with
their employers?
This Note will examine the propriety of bringing a tort action for
interference with contractual relations against a breaching athlete and the
viability of this action in such circumstances. Throughout this Note, the
masculine pronoun will be used when referring to the player, the season
ticket holder, and the stranger to their contract. The first section of this
Note will examine the history of the interference tort and the tort's
purpose. Section II will examine the elements necessary to establish a
prima facie case for the interference tort. Finally, this Note will conclude
with an analysis of the season ticket holders' plight and why, when
objectively applying the law to such circumstances, the season ticket
holders should prevail on their claim.
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Where Party A and Party B have entered into a contract, the tort of
intentional interference with contractual relations recognizes the right of
Party A to bring a cause of action against a party not in privity to the
contract (stranger), who induces Party B to breach the contract. 6 The tort
was originally limited in scope and recovery to special economic
relationships that were created without the stabilizing influence of a
contractual agreement. 7 The lack of a contractual agreement created one
unstable economic relationship after another, as either party was free to
sever the relationship at the behest of a stranger.8 The modern day tort of
interference with contractual relations grew out of the enticement-ofservant action, which was created to address this instability. 9
The enticement-of-servant action stabilized the labor supply by
giving masters the right to sue persons who enticed away their servants.10
5 See Yashin, 186 D.L.R.4th at 768 (dismissing action against defendant for lack of
evidence in support of intent to benefit). The Yashin court found that the club's marketing
efforts involving Yashin did not create an implied term that the club would "take all
reasonable steps within its control to ensure that Mr. Yashin would be part of its roster in
the 1999-2000 season." Id. at 767.
6 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1.
7 See Donald. C. Dowling, Jr., A Contract Theory for a Complex Tort: Limiting
Interference with Contract Beyond the Unlawful Means Test, 40 U. MIAMI. L. REv. 487,
495-96 (1986)(discussing origins of interference tort). Dowling discusses the tort's
evolution from laws protecting the Landlord/Tenant and Master/Servant relationships. Id.
8 See id.
9 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 976-77 (explaining
origins of interference with contract tort).
10 See id. The Black Death in England had so diminished the labor force that
competition for servants resulted in persons enticing them away from their masters. Id. at
976. The response was the Ordinance of Labourers, which provided masters with a cause
of action against those engaged in these practices. Id. at 977.
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This action was viewed as more necessary to restore the social and
economic order of the time rather than to protect the rights of individuals. "
In Lumley v. Gye,' 2 the English court extended the enticement of servants
action to situations in which a stranger procures an employee's breach of
an employment contract.1 3 Lumley signaled a shift from a societal interest
in maintaining the social order to an interest in
maintaining economic order
4
through the integrity of contractual relations.'
A lack of confidence in the integrity of contractual relationships can
weaken the market economy because many economic decisions are reliant
upon the perfyrmance of contracts.1 5 The interference tort assures parties
contemplating these economic decisions that their newly created property
rights will remain free from intermeddling strangers. 16 A stranger who,
notwithstanding this contract, chooses 7 to interfere should pay for any
damages he causes the aggrieved party.'
Traditional contract remedies may be unavailing to an aggrieved
promisee.' 8 Although a promisee may have an action against a promisor
for the promisor's breach, such a remedy may not have the deterrent effect
intended.19 For example, a promisor may invoke the doctrine of efficient
breach where it may pose an economically sound alternative to
performance.20 Additionally, the doctrine of impossibility excuses the
11 See John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of
Society's Interest in Commercial Stability and ContractualIntegrity, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1491, 1509 (1981) (arguing deterrence of enticement of servants had social implications
beyond individual interests).
12 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
13 See id. at 755 (Erie, J.)(stating principles of enticement of servant
and present case
same); id. at 758 (Wightman, J.)(extending enticement of servants to procurement of breach
of personal services contracts). In Lumley, the plaintiff had an exclusive contract with one
Johanna Wagner to sing at the plaintiffs theatre. Id. at 750. The defendant, owner of a
rival theatre enticed Wagner to breach her contract with the plaintiff and sing at the
defendant's theatre instead. Id.
14 See Danforth, supra note 11, at 1511 (noting shift of concern to stabilizing
economy through integrity of contractual relations).
15 See Danforth, supra note 11 (recognizing effect of contractual stability
on market
economy). Danforth notes that many economic decisions in a market economy are
dependent on the reliability of contracts. Id.
16 See Dowling, supra note 7, at 505 (recognizing act of contracting creates intangible
piece of property). Dowling notes the Lumley Court's recognition that a contract's
promised performance is "worthy of protection as physical property." Id.
17 See Dowling, supra note 7, at 505 (recognizing those not party to contract must
either respect contract or pay damages).
18 Compare Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic
Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and ContractDoctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 76-77 (1982)
(outlining instance where contract remedies may fail), with Dowling, supra note 7, at 510
(noting purpose of contracting to assure recovery in event of non-performance).
See Danforth, supra note 11, at 1511 (noting that contract remedies do not deter
breach).
20 See Clark A. Remington, Intentional Interference with Contract and the Doctrine
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promisor's performance where occurrences that the contracting parties did
not initially contemplate make performance impossible. 2' The interference
tort considers breaching parties who are willing but unable to perform
because performance has been frustrated by a stranger's actions.22 Where
the breaching party has an excuse recognized in contract law, tort law
affords this alternative cause of action in the form of the interference tort.23
III. PRIMA FACIE CASE
To properly articulate the propriety of a season ticket holder
bringing a tort action for interference with contractual relations, an
examination of the elements of the tort is necessary. Because states differ
as to the exact requirement to establish a prima facie case for the tort, this
Note will focus primarily on Massachusetts law. 24 Tortious interference
with contractual relations is elucidated in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 766.25

of Efficient Breach: Fine Tuning the Notion of the Contract Breacher as Wrongdoer, 47
BurF. L. REv. 645, 647-48(1999)(discussing instances where breach more efficient than
performance). Oliver Wendell Holmes recognized that contracts give the parties the choice
to perform or pay damages. Id. at 647. Remington notes that contract remedies actually
encourage breaches by allowing a party to pay damages that do not outweigh the costs of
performance. Id.
21 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (Main Vol. 1979). This section
identifies the doctrine of impossibility as:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable
without his fault by occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that
performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the
contrary.
Id.

22

See Developments in the Law -- Competitive Tort: Interference with Contractual

Relations, supra note 22 (observing frustration of contract occurs where third party
interferes with otherwise willing promisor); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
766, cmt. k (1977)(stating interference exists where performance frustrated by depriving
promisor means of performance).
23 See Perlman, supra note 18, at 76 (discussing advantages of interference tort).
24 See Danforth, supra note 11, at 1500-1505 (recognizing states differ on basis of
tortious interference claim).
25 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§766 (Main Vol. 1977). The section reads:

One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a
contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by
inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from
the failure of the third person to perform the contract.
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Massachusetts adopted the Restatement's view on tortious
interference with contractual relations and announced the elements of a
prima facie tort in recent case law.26 To recover for interference with
contractual relations in Massachusetts, a plaintiff must prove: the plaintiff
had an existing contract with a third party, the defendant knew of the
contract, the defendant intentionally interfered for an improper purpose
or
27
by improper means, and the interference caused harm to the plaintiff.
A. Existence of a Contract
The existence of a contract with a third person is the first element
that the plaintiff must prove.28 Courts will look at the express and implied
terms of the contract to determine whether the plaintiff has an enforceable
right.29 Courts will look at the team's season ticket marketing practices to
determine30 if those marketing practices implied that an athlete would
perform.
To bring an action based on an advertising's representations, the
plaintiff must show that he knew of the advertising and that he relied on
the representations in that advertising when he purchased the ticket. 3' In
Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc.32, in response to an investigation into
consumer fraud claims, the Attorney General of New York and the New
Jersey Nets reached an agreement to compensate fans who purchased
tickets based on the team's advertising.33 The team agreed to a rebate for
ticket holders' who purchased tickets "solely on the basis that Julius
Erving would play for the Nets." 34
26

See Shafir v. Steele, 727 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (Mass. 2000) (recognizing Section

766, Restatement (Second) Torts, as Massachusetts law).
27 See Swanset Dev. Corp. v. Taunton, 668 N.E.2d 333, 338 (Mass. 1996) (listing
prima facie elements for intentional interference with contractual relations).
28 See American Private Line Servs., Inc. v. Eastern Microwave, Inc., 980 F.2d 33, 36
(1st Cir. 1992)(finding no claim where failure to prove existence of contract); United Truck
Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 551 N.E.2d 20, 21 (Mass. 1990); See generally Jeffrey C.
Melick, Tortious Interference with Business Relations, MASSACHUSETTS TORT LAW
MANuAL ch. 13 (1999) (outlining prima facie elements).
29 See Melick, supra note 28, § 13.2. 1(a) (recognizing contract formation through
oral
or written, express or implied terms).
30 See Strauss, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
3 See id. at 235. The Strauss Court stated, "[iut is elementary that in any action based
upon representations in advertising.. .the plaintiff must prove knowledge of, and reliance
upon, the representation alleged." Id; See also Yashin, 186 D.L.R.4th at 767 (finding
plaintiff's failure to show advertising intended to induce purchase fatal to claim).
32 401 N.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
33 See Strauss, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 234. The team had promoted its star player, Julius
Erving ("Dr. J."), during its season ticket marketing campaign. Id. The advertisements
invited fans to come and see Dr. J play at Nets games. Id.
34 See id. at 234 (outlining terms of 10 percent rebate to ticket holders). The
agreement required the ticket holders to sign an affidavit stating that (a) the tickets were
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The Strauss court, however, questioned the extent it could presume
that the fans relied on the defendant's advertising.
The problem the
Strauss court found with the plaintiffs claim was that the plaintiff was
unable to prove reliance beyond a naked presumption.36 The court
reasoned that the plaintiffs' circumstances did not warrant a presumption
they saw and/or relied on the team's advertising.3 7 Massachusetts
recognizes the power of advertising by constructing express warranties
where advertising statements are the basis of a consumer's bargain. 38
B. Defendant's Knowledge
The second element necessary to sustain a claim is the stranger's
knowledge of the contract. 39 The requirement of knowledge is necessary
to limit the broad range of potential plaintiffs in this tort.40 Without
requiring the defendant's knowledge of an existing contract, the number of
persons claiming to be harmed by the defendant's actions could become
endless. 4' Persons who were never in contemplation of the parties but who
were affected by efficient breaches would find themselves in a position to
bring an action.42
If a stranger does not have knowledge of the contract, then he
cannot intentionally interfere with contract.4 3 Intent requires that the result
purchased in reliance on Julius Erving playing for the team: (b) the tickets were purchased
for personal use only; and (c) the Nets would be released from any other claims. Id.
35 See id. at 238. "In this age of 'team-jumping ballplayers' and 'renegotiated'
athletic contracts, the risk that Dr. J might not be playing for the Nets might 'fairly be
regarded as within the risks that (a purchaser) assumed under the contract."' Id.
36 See id. at 236 (citing cases in which presumption reliable). "[B]y no stretch of the
imagination may one comfortably presume that a majority of season ticket holders
purchased in reliance on the Nets' newspaper advertising." Id.
37 See Strauss, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 236. The court found the fact that fans purchased
tickets over several months was not enough to create a presumption that those fans relied on
the seven days of newspaper advertising promoting Dr. J. Id.
38 See Stuto v. Corning Glass Works, CIV. A. No. 88-I 150-WF, 1990 WL 105615, at
*5 (D. Mass. July 23, 1990)(recognizing creation express warranties through statements in
advertising). The Stuto court recognized that many courts and the U.C.C. find that if a
buyer relies on the statements in advertising as a basis of the bargain, then the
advertisement will have created an express warranty. Id.
39 See Swanset Dev. Corp. v. Taunton, 668 N.E.2d 333, 338 (Mass. 1996); See also
Melick, supra note 2 8(citing Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, 165 F.2d 815, 821 (1st Cir.
1948)).
40 See Perlman, supra note 18, at 76-77 (noting intent requirement sets plaintiffs
injuries apart from more remote injuries resulting from defendant's actions). The number
of potential plaintiffs becomes smaller when the plaintiff is required to show that the third
party knew of the contract. Id.
41 See Perlman, supra note 18, at 76-77.
42

43

See id.
See KEETON

ET AL.,

supra note 1, at 994 (stating intentional interference

presupposes knowledge of plaintiff's interest); see also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS,
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was substantially certain to occur and that the actor either desired the result
or knew the result would occur. 44 The defendant, therefore, need only
know that the contract exists and that he is interfering with its
performance; he need not be aware of the legal consequences inured to the
contract.4 5 In Massachusetts, knowledge is imputed to the defendant if the
circumstances indicate that he should have known of the existence of the
contract.46
C. Use of ImproperMotive or Means

The American Law Institute adopted the requirement of improper
purpose or means as a measure to limit the number of colorable
complaints.4 7 When the tort was first pronounced in Lumley, the judges
stressed the malicious intent of the wrongdoer as an element of the
action.48 Malice, however, is not the touchstone of the tort.49
Like most modern courts, Massachusetts eschewed the malice
requirement in establishing a prima facie case of intentional interference.
Instead, Massachusetts requires that the intentional interference be
improper in motive or means. 5' Massachusetts explained that the standard
for improper motive or means includes those that are wrongful by "statute
or other regulations or a recognized rule of common law or perhaps an
established standard of trade or profession. '52 Furthermore, Massachusetts
recognizes those acts outlined as improper in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 767. 53
§ 766 cmt. i (1977) (stating stranger's knowledge necessary for liability).
44 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1979).
45 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. i (1977). "It is not necessary
that
the actor appreciate the legal significance of the facts giving rise to the contractual duty..

Id.
46 See Mellick, supra note 28 (citing Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, 165 F.2d 815,
821 (lst Cir. 1948)).
47 See Perlman, supra note 18, at 71.
48 See generally Lumley, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (finding defendant acted
maliciously);

see also KEETON
Lumley).
49

ET AL,

supra note I, at 977 (noting emphasis upon malice of defendant in

See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 766 cmt. s (1977)(finding malice only one

type of interference and not requisite); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 979
(observing "malice" as requisite for improper motive dropped from cases).
50 See United Truck Leasing, 551 N.E.2d at 22 (observing malice not element of
tortious interference with contractual relations in Massachusetts).
51 See id. at 23 (accepting improper motive or means as element of tortious
interference with contractual relations). In United Truck Leasing, the court held that there
was no interference with contractual relations where the defendant's motive included, inter
alia, benefiting hinrself financially rather than hurting the plaintiff. Id. at 24.
52 See United Truck Leasing, 551 N.E.2d
at 23.
53 See id. at 24 (recognizing section 767 as helpful in determining impropriety of
interference). Section 767 reads:
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The nature of the actor's conduct is one of the factors to consider
when considering the propriety of the interference.5 4 There is no legitimate
privilege to interfere where the purpose of the interference is to exert
economic pressure on another.55
The Restatement Massachusetts
considers, inter alia, economic pressure as an improper means of
interference with a contract.5 6 Considering the circumstances in which the
pressure is exerted, the actor's objective, and the reasonableness of the
pressure as a means to achieving that objective,
will aid the court in
57
determining the propriety of economic pressure.
IV. ANALYSIS

A. Why the Tort Applies to the Season-Ticket Holder
The season-ticket holder's right to bring an action in tort against a
breaching athlete is created when the ticket holder enters into a contract

In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering with a
contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or not,
consideration is given to the following factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interest of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the
contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 767 (1979).
§ 767 (1979).

54 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

55 See Keeton ET AL., supra note 1, at 1001 (finding less privilege where objective to
pressure plaintiff into complying with defendant's collateral matter). Prosser gives
examples of this type of pressure as including, inter alia, forcing compromise to a claim or
extorting money. Id.
56 See Hanna Paper Recycling v. ZBR Pub., Inc., No. 870891, 1994 WL 879724 at *3
(Mass. Super. Feb. 3, 1994) (considering Section 767's definition of economic pressure in
evaluating propriety of actor's conduct).
57 See id. at *3 (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 767 cmt. c
(1979)). section 767 states, in pertinent part:
In light of the circumstances in which it is exerted, the object sought to be
accomplished by the actor, the degree of coercion involved, the extent of the harm
that it threatens, the effect upon the neutral parties drawn into the situation ...
and the general reasonableness of and appropriateness of this pressure as a means
of accomplishing the actor's objective.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 cmt. c (1979).
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with a professional sports franchise to purchase season tickets. 58 The
agreement between the ticket holder and the team creates an intangible
property interest in the product the team is purporting to field. 59 An
athlete's refusal to perform under the terms of his or her existing contract
interferes with the quality and value of the product by diminishing the
team's overall attractiveness and, arguably, on-field performance,
particularly when that athlete is one of the team's elite. 6° If the terms of
the season ticket contract include a promise to deliver the performance of a
particular athlete, then that athlete's decision not to perform will frustrate
the team's ability to deliver the product as promised and, therefore, cause a
breach. 6' By frustrating the team's ability to deliver the product, the
athlete has interfered with the contract between the team and the ticket
holder.62
The ticket holder may attempt to recover damages from the team for
breach of contract. 63 The team, however, has breached through no fault of
its own because the breach was actually caused by the athlete's refusal to
perform under the terms of his or her valid and existing contract. 64 Under
the doctrine of impossibility, the team will be excused from providing the
season-ticket holder with the promised product. 65 The ticket holder,
therefore, has no actionable contract claim against the team. 66 The ticket
holder is left in a position where the property right created by his contract
with the team has been damaged through the improper acts of the athlete,
yet he has no cause of action under contract law.67
The tort of interference with contractual relations provides the
season ticket holder with a remedy where he would otherwise have none.68
58 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (observing right of aggrieved party to
seek damages against strangers not respecting contract).
59 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing property
right created by

contractual agreements).
60 See PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, PLAYING FOR DOLLARS: LABOR RELATIONS AND THE

SPORTS BUSINESS 33 (Cornell University Press 1996) (noting correlation between winning
teams and highly paid athletes). Staudohar notes the positive relationship between highly
paid athletes and their superior performance and the positive relationship between highsalaried and winning teams. Id.
61 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing frustration of contract
performance).
62 See supra note 22 (identifying frustration as type of interference).
63 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (recognizing rights against breaching
parties for damages caused by breach).
64 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (finding breaching parties unaccountable
where performance frustrated by unforeseeable events).
See supra note 21 and accompanying text (explaining doctrine of impossibility).
66 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing instances where contract
remedies fail).
67

See id.

68 See supra notes 18 and 22 and accompanying text (explaining purpose of

interference tort intended to reconcile failure of contract remedies).
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In a situation such as this, the tort's value is evident because it affords the
ticket holder a right of action against the athlete. 69 Instead of being left
with a diminished property value and no cause of action, the ticket holder
is now in a position to recover against the athlete if he can establish a
prima facie case of intentional interference.7 °
B. The Burden of the Season Ticket Holder: Establishinga Prima
Facie Case
1. Existing Contract
Perhaps the most difficult element for the season ticket holder to
prove is that the player's appearance was a term of the contract with the
team because the ticket holder must adduce evidence that the player's
appearance on the team was part of the basis of the bargain. 71 The ticket
holder must demonstrate that he knew of the advertising and relied on its
representations when making his decision to purchase the tickets.72
Although the Strauss court rejected the particular season ticket holder's
claims of reliance on advertising in that case, it did not deny the possibility
that advertising does create implied terms of a contract.73
A closer look at the motivations behind advertising in professional
sports reveals team strategies of promoting star players as a means of
inducing fans to purchase season tickets. 74 The economics of sports dictate
the necessity of generating revenue through, among other things, fan
attendance at sporting events. 75 A direct correlation is seen between the
quality of the and fan attendance.76 It is incumbent upon teams, therefore,
to gather a collection of the best players possible in order to sustain fan
interest and excitement.77 Without the fan support at the gates, the sports
69 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
70

tort).

See supra note 27 and accompanying text (identifying elements of interference

See id.
See supra note 21.
73 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (stating reasons why ticket holders'
claim failed in this particular case).
74 See supra notes 33 and accompanying text (demonstrating instances where teams
promote their star player).
71
72

75 See PAUL D. STAUDOHAR & JAMES A. MANGAN, THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL

SPORTS 6 (Paul D. Staudohar & James A. Mangan eds., University of Illinois Press 1991)
(discussing ticket sales as main source of revenue).
76 See ROGER G. NOLL, THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 31 (Paul D.
Staudohar & James A. Mangan eds., University of Illinois Press 1991) (stating financial
success of team depends on quality of team).
77 See generally NOLL, supra note 76 (discussing importance of gate receipts and
signing of marquee players to increase those receipts).
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franchise will remain economically viable. 78 Furthermore, athletes are
benefiting themselves
by performing in front of paying fans and creating
79
interest in the team.
The season ticket holder's case is strengthened if he can create a
presumption that his purchase was based on the advertising campaign. 80
To do this, he will need to show that he had knowledge of the advertising
when he purchased the tickets. 8' A court is more likely to find the plaintiff
had knowledge of the advertising if he can show that the campaign ran
over an extended period of time in a highly visible manner. 82 This
increases the likelihood
that he saw the advertising and that it was a basis
83
of the bargain.
2. Knowledge
To show that the athlete intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs
contract, the athlete must have had knowledge of the existence of the
season ticket contract. 84 This prima facie element should not be difficult
for any season ticket holder to prove.85 The ticket holder must simply
show that, based on the circumstances, the athlete should have known that
the team enters into season ticket contracts with fans and that the team
promotes the athlete as a reason to come and see the team perform. 86 The
athlete need not be aware that the failure to perform will have legal
consequences with respect to the season ticket holder. 87 It is axiomatic that
if the fan sees and relies on advertising representations then it is likely that
the athlete also knows of both the existence of those advertisements and
that they promote him as a part of the team.
Concerns that this tort may be overreaching are unwarranted in
these circumstances. 88 The tort limits the scope of recovery to the season
78

See supra note 76.

79 See NOLL, supra note 76, at 39. "By agreeing to restrictions on the competition
for

players, goes the argument, players are advancing their own interests by improving fan
interest in the game and preserving well-paid jobs for all." Id.
80 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
81 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
82 Cf. supra note 37 and accompanying text (rejecting claims where advertising lasted
only seven days).
83 See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing reliance on advertising as
basis of bargain).
94 See supra notes 39 and 43 and accompanying
text.
85 See Developments in the Law -- Competitive Tort: Interference
with Contractual
Relations, supra note 22, at 960 (finding knowledge requirement poses few legal problems).
86 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (imputing knowledge on
defendant
where circumstances indicate defendant should have known of contract).
87 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (finding appreciation
of legal
significance not requirement of interference tort).
88 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing potentially large number of
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ticket holder by requiring that the athlete know that a contract between the
season ticket holder and team exists. 89 Those not in a comparable position
of the season ticket holder will be unable to recover because the athlete
will not have knowledge of their contract. 9° The number of potential
plaintiffs, therefore, is limited. 9'
3. Improper Means or Motive
A court also must find the athlete's objective and means in which he
hoped to achieve that objective were improper.92 The athlete need not
intend to harm the season ticket holder to have an improper means.9 3 But
he is
where an athlete refuses to perform until his contract is renegotiated,
94
improperly using economic pressure to achieve his objective.
By refusing to perform, the athlete is, in essence, forcing the team
into a compromise that requires them to pay the athlete more money or risk
a season that does not live up to expectations. 95 When seasons do not live
up to .expectations, fans become disenchanted and often stop attending
games, directly affecting the team's revenue. 96 Such an action, therefore,
is an improper means of interference.
V.

CONCLUSION

This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive on the issue of tort
actions for interference with contractual relations. Rather, it is a cursory
look at how one might proceed with such a claim and why it is proper to do
so in the event of an athlete's breach. Having established the prima facie
case of the interference tort, the season ticket holder may very well have a
cause of action against a breaching athlete. Moreover, the season ticket
holder deserves this cause of action because he has lost property value due
to the intentional acts of another. The tort of intentional interference with
contractual relations not only provides a useful remedy for sports fans who
plaintiffs without knowledge requirement).
89 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing knowledge requirement's
limiting effect on number of potential plaintiffs).
9 See id.
91 Cf supra note 18 and accompanying text.
92 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (observing maliciousness not necessary
to establish improper means).
94 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (stating economic pressure to force
compromise type of improper means).
95 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
96 See supra note 75 - 76 and accompanying text (recognizing correlation between
noncompetitive teams and low attendance rates); see also supra note 74 and accompanying
text (discussing ticket sales as main revenue source).
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feel wronged, it acts to deter contractual breaches by professional athletes
who would otherwise refuse to perform their valid contracts, thus
stabilizing the economic landscape of the sporting industry.
Matthew D. Thompson

